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The Future of Uniform Laws-The
Commercial Code
FRANK E. HoRAcE JR. *
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws plans to promulgate the Commercial Code in time for its
adoption by the states in 1951. The Code is the Conference's most
ambitious undertaking to date. It unifies and codifies most of the
law relating to mercantile, security, investment, and bank transactions. It includes the law formerly included in the Negotiable Instruments Act, the Sales and Conditional Sales Acts, Warehouse Receipts and Bills of Lading Acts, Trust Receipts, Bank Collection and
several other uniform laws.
Its size and ambitious coverage of subject matters have posed
innumerable policy questions for the Commissioners and have
raised question if not doubt as to the probability of its widespread
adoption. In the first place, the code departs substantially from
contemporary Conference tradition. "Short Acts," Commissioners
have admonished, "are much more readily passed by legislatures
than long ones . . .
But the Code is long and includes all but a
few of the most important and most frequently adopted uniform
acts. Secondly, the Conference in recent years has accepted the
role of defender of "states' rights" against the encroachment of federal authority. But the Code is drafted in anticipation of both federal and state adoption. Finally, the Conference has maintained
strict independence of all other bodies and agencies. But the Commercial Code is the joint project of the Conference and the American Law Institute. Thus, the offering of the Commercial Code to
the states will be a test not only of the validity of the policy determinations of the draftsmen but also of the fundamental postulates of Conference operation and procedure.
That these procedures deserve a test provided by a different
philosophy of operation is indicated by the fact that in tlie more
than 50 years of Conference history only one act has received unanimous adoption 2 and only five acts have achieved substantial uni* Professor of Law, Indiana University.
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formity. I The great majority of Conference proposals have been
adopted in much less than one-half of the states. 4 This record
suggests that some experiment in method is justified. It is not intended, however, as a picture of defeat or a prediction of future
failure.
The Conference itself is an organization of great inherent
strength. Its personnel, recruited from the bench, bar, and classrooms of the 53 jurisdictions, encompasses the social, economic, and
political experience of rural and urban societies and the contrasting
viewpoints of a geographically diverse nation. The personal scholarship, industry, and integrity of the Commissioners have produced
an informal legislative body of unmatched competence. Individually
and collectively the Commissioners have performed their duties
with a responsibility which assures not only a quality product but
also reflects a high sense of public duty in its manufacture.
WHY SHOULD STATE LAWS BE UNIFORI?

In many areas of regulation there is in fact no need for uniformity. Diversity in social, political, and ethnical background,
contrast in economic organization, and variation in climatic and
geographic circumstances may even make uniformity in some areas
of the law undesirable. But the integrating factors of transportation, commerce, and national unity, to a very large degree, dictate
that common-law traditions and institutions are more likely to be
similar than dissimilar and that diversity of law between the states
3 UNIFORM WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS ACT (52); UNIFoRMv STOCK TRANSFER
ACT (46); UNI'oFR NARCoTIc DRUG ACT (43); UgNImoRm SALES ACT (37);
UNIFORM VETERANS GUARDIANSHIP ACT (37); and even of these the Uniform

Narcotic Drug Act, the Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform Veterans Guardianship Act have been submitted in revised form so that the uniformity between the states is not as great as would appear.
Of the 53 acts listed as uniform in the 1945 Handbook only 15 have
been adopted in 25 or more of the 53 jurisdictions. In addition to the uniform acts, 15 acts are listed as model acts and four have been placed on the

inactive list. For an excellent analysis of the first 50 years of Conference
operation, see Schnader, President's Address, 1940 HANDBOOK, CONFERENCE
OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 35; 1941 HANDBOOK, CONFERENCE
OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 38. Uniformity might be
achieved " by getting all of the courts to commence over again and follow

the decisions of some one court. The difficulties in the way of doing thi.
readily suggest themselves to the lawyer who has ever attempted to get

court to overrule a former decision, or who has ever applied for a rehearing
One of the greatest troubles would be in getting all the others to follom
the one. Each one would think itself the one to be followed and not the on
to follow. * * * It is clear, then, that in order to bring about the desirec

uniformity we must have not only legislation by Congress, but legislatioi
by the legislatures of the different States." Tompkins, The Necessity foi
Uniformity in the Laws Governing Commercial Papers, 13 A.B.A. REP
247, 261, 262 (1890).
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is more likely to be the result of accident than of reason. In a
nation with essentially common customs, uniformity on the basic
postulates of law and government is to be expected and diversity
to be viewed with suspicion.
Uniformity, however, speaks at several levels-uniformity of
substance, of procedure, of administration, of judicial decision, even
of community support. Diversity of substantive law is amazingly
small when the size of the nation is considered and the independence
of 49 legislative bodies is emphasized. Indeed, whether the diversity
be judicially or legislatively created, the slight but almost infinite
variations are the hazard which lawyers and business men fear.
It is not the log but the unseen sturdy vine which trips the unwary
traveler. Because it is the lawyer who must guide the merchant
on the trail, the clearing of the path has been his primary concern.
Elimination of judicial variation has never come easily except by
statute and thus the lawyer has sought legislation as a means of
achieving uniformity. Uniformity of substance through uniformity
of statutory expression seemed to offer the surest way of achieving
uniformity of judicial interpretation and thus it was easy for the
Conference to accept the practice of measuring its success in terms
of uniformity of statutory expression.
UNIFORMVI

FOR UNIFORMITY'S SAKE

Perhaps this is only another way of emphasizing the Conference's reliance on form, but in addition it implies belief that uniformity is a good in itself. Certainly in many areas this cannot be
denied; for example, wherever a legal question arises in a conflict
of laws situation the existence of the same rule in the several states
greatly simplifies the lawyer's problem and increases the certainty
of the law. But where no conflict situation arises uniformity of
rule is of less concern except for those individuals who assume the
responsibility of acting in a multiplicity of jurisdictions. Here, uniformity of law is convenient though hardly essential. The groups
concerned, however, are large: the commercial and mercantile interests, the transport and communication services, and the agencies
of government itself.
Nevertheless, uniformity may frequently imply excessive stability in that it places a heavy sanction on the retention of the uniform law and an avoidance of experimentation with new and perhaps better legal controls. Certainly no state could afford on its
own to make the changes in the Sales Act or Negotiable Instruments Act which the Conference is now anticipating in its
new Commercial Code and yet those changes reflect a substantial
improvement in the concept of legal regulations synthesized with
business practice. An attempt to resolve this desire for certainty
with the desire for change presents the age-old conflict between
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the law of precedent as understood in the case law and the desire
to make the law reflect a changing social order. It is perhaps for
this reason that the Conference itself has always characterized itself
as a conservative body 5 which should not enter into controversial
fields of legislation but should rather await the resolution of the
controversy and then proceed to unify the experiment. The fear is
that at this point unification is impossible and the proposal of a
uniform law comes too late.
PROPER SUBJECT MATTER
The above assumption that the Conference should propose a
uniform act only after agreement has been reached among the
states has, perhaps, been the greatest single retarding force in the
success of the Conference. While there will certainly be controversy
between those who see the lawyer as a skilled artisan and those who
vizualize the lawyer's function as participating in and giving direction to policy, there will be little argument over the fact that
the Conference has not achieved results when it has proposed uniform laws in advance of the crystalization of policy within the
states. Thus, the Conference offered and then withdrew such acts
as the Agricultural Cooperative Association Act which had but one
adoption, The Airports Act which had two, the Aeronautical Regulatory Act which had three, The Automobile Liability Security Act
which had three, and the Public Utilities Act which had no adoptions.
The Conference, therefore, assumed that if it entered areas
where policy was more stabilized the chance of uniformity was
enhanced. It recognized that in some areas of stabilized policy,
local situations made uniform adoption unlikely. As Commissioner
O'Connell pointed out, the Mechanics Lien Act ". . . will be impossible of passage in practically any of the states of the union.
The law is pretty well settled in every community. . . the Mechanics Lien Law cannot be universally applied in this country.
The building of an hotel in Atlantic City is brought about under
conditions that never could obtain, for instance, in Oklahoma or
San Francisco." 6
Likewise, the Committee on Review and Revision of Uniform
and Model Acts in recommending that the Child Labor Act be declared obsolete said, ". . . no states had legislation touching this
subject since conditions of employment vary substantially in the
"The Conference has always been characterized by conservatism and

doubtless its best traditions in this regard will be preserved, as they should."
Terry, President's
ON UNIFORMv
6

1932

LAWS 47.

Address, 1914 HANDBOOK, CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
STATE LAWS 106, 118.
HANDBOOK, CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORIMI STATE
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several states, uniformity of adoption is unlikely." 7 Likewise the
Conference engaged in considerable face-saving by reclassifying at
the same meeting seven acts as model acts; in other words, they
thought the Acts good but not likely of general adoption. A review
of the acts and their prior successes certainly justified the judgment of the Conference."
If the Conference is correct in its conclusion that its effectiveness is limited primarily to the narrow field where local conditions
do not require variation in legal rule, where policy has stabilized,
and where jurisprudential innovations are not involved, what then
is left? On the one hand there remain areas in which states have
in fact achieved substantial statutory uniformity, and on the other,
areas unregulated by statutes but within the classical common law.
It is at this point that it appears that the Conference has made
two serious errors in judgment concerning its own achievements:
first, that its success has been in the field of commercial law because
of the subject matter involved; and second, that its success has
been with short acts rather than with long ones.
It is true that the uniform statutes which have achieved greatest uniformity have been commercial acts. But the reason for this
success is not so much because the subject matter of the act related
to commercial transactions which, because of their very nature,
demanded uniformity, but because at the time of the proposal and
adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Act and of the Sales Act
the great majority of the states had no statutory law upon the subject. Other uniform acts in the commercial field have never
achieved the success of the original three. 1 The Arbitration Act
has had but six adoptions; Public Corporations Act, four; Business
Records Act, 14; Fiduciaries Act, 20; Fraudulent Conveyance Act,
18; Insurers Liquidation Act, eight; Joint Obligations Act, five;
Limited Partnership Act, 16; Unauthorized Insurers Act, four; Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act, six; Written Obligations Act, two.
Some non-commercial acts have fared much better. The Act to
Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal Proceedings has had 27 adoptions; Desertion and Nonsupport
Act, 21; Criminal Extradition Act, 24; Declaratory Judgments Act,
7

Also, UNIFoRm CRIMINAL STATISTICS ACT (1 adoption); rNIFomM PUB(no adoptions); UNIFORM DIVORCE JURISDICTION ACT (1
adoption). 1943 HANDBOOK, CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS 147,151.
8
UNIFoRM INTER PARTY AGREEMENT ACT (four adoptions); UNIFORM
JOINT OBLIGATIONS ACT (five); UNI7o~mV EXPERT TEsTImoNY ACT (two);
Lic UTILITIES ACT

UNIFORvr CoMPosITE

RECORDS AS EVIDENCE ACT

(two);

UNIFORIV

CoRPORATIONs ACT (four); UNIFORM WRITTEN OBLIGATIONS ACT

BusINEss

(two);

Id.

at 152.

9The UNIFORM WAREHOUSE RECEIPTS ACT, the UNIFORM NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS ACT,the UN FoR SALES ACT.

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 9

23; Federal Tax Lien Registration Act, 24; Judicial Notice of Foreign
Law Act, 20; Narcotic Drug Act, 42; Proof of Statutes Act, 27; Simultaneous Death Act, 26; Stock Transfer Act, 40; Veterans' Guardianship Act, 36. Thus, it appears that it is not the commercial character of the subject matter that has insured a high percentage of
adoptions but rather the timing of Conference proposals to fit the
needs of codification. In other words, at that point of time when
the public and practitioners alike are prepared to crystalize, with
some modification to be sure, the common law of a given subject
matter, the chance of general adoption of a proposed uniform act is
greatly enhanced.
TESTS OF UNIFORMITY

In determining uniformity the Conference has considered as
uniform only those state statutes whose titles conclude with the
phrase "and to make uniform the laws thereof." Thus, state acts
substantially similar in substance but not following the language
of the uniform acts have not been accepted as "uniform" by the
Conference. This means that in a considerable number of states
statutes similar to the uniform acts are not recognized as uniform;
yet in these states there is little or no possibility of the adoption
of uniform acts. Legislatures are quite properly concerned with
matters of substance, and they have neither the inclination nor the
time to tidy up formalistic variations in statutory expression, when
the substantive effect is negligible.
It seems clear that the Conference should examine all enactments within the areas of their own promulgations and determine
those state acts in substantial conformity with their own and treat
them as uniform. The Conference should concentrate its efforts
for adoption in those states where basic conflict occurs between the
local legislation and the uniform law, and in those states which have
no statute. If substantial but limited variations exist between the
uniform act and the law of a particular state, attempts should not
be made to seek the enactment of the uniform act, but instead
specific amendments should be drafted by the Conference to achieve
more complete uniformity in the individual state.
Beginnings in this direction were made in 1947 when Commissioner Bogert recommended that the Conference should ". . . learn
to what extent the fields covered by uniform legislation were already treated in statutes, although the uniform acts were not
adopted, so that commissioners might be aided in deciding what
uniform laws were needed in their several states." 10
An analysis of these variations, even limited to areas in which
uniform legislation exists, is an ambitious undertaking and one that
might well be subsidized with a full-time research staff. Such a sur10 Circular letter to Commissioners, August 17, 1948, p. 4.
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vey will inevitably lead to Conference-sponsored amendments to
eliminate substantial variations in particular states. With codification in many of the traditional common-law areas already achieved
in most of the states, piecemeal substitution of individual uniform
acts is not likely to achieve greater success in the future than it has
in the past. Specific amendments or area-wide recodifications, such
as the Commercial Code, are the only alternatives.
A second and long-term consequence of a full scale Conference
survey would be the publication of a compilation of the laws of all
the jurisdictions in the areas covered by uniform acts setting forth
the state statutes both uniform and nonuniform. Such a manual
would serve the cause of uniformity in two ways. It would make
available the statute law of every jurisdiction and, though not creating uniformity in itself, would tend to eliminate many of the unexpected pitfalls which are one of the primary curses of diversity."
Secondly, such a volume would tangibly portray the nonconformity
which today is discoverable only by the difficult process of identifying the states which are not listed as having adopted uniform legislation. Psychologically the volume itself would be the best argument for uniformity. Finally, such a compilation might open the
way for a modern Stimson.
Until that happy goal is reached the Conference must recognize
that on the one hand it claims too much when it accepts credit for
all acts with "uniform titles", and on the other claims too little
when it excludes from its calculations those state acts which
in all but a few particulars are blood brothers with uniform acts.
The test of uniformity must be forever uniformity in the fact of
operation and not in the form of expression.
UNIFoRmITy TnRouGH FEDERAL ACTION

The reports of the proceedings of the Conference for the past
20 years give no hint that uniformity may be achieved in any other
manner than by the adoption of uniform laws. The reports are
eloquent with expressed fears of federal encroachment on the domain of the states and of the need of Thermopylaete to stay the
attack. Such attitudes, however, were not held by the American
2
Bar Association nor by the Conference at the time of its formation.
The opinion was general that codification and uniformity were to be
pursued with vigor, limited only by the dictates of the subject matter and constitutional limitations. 3 Federal enactment, interstate
11 "The annoyance arising from various and conflicting laws seemed
common to all the states . . . ." Brewster, Report, Committee on Uniform
State Laws, 14 A.B.A. REP. 365, 367 (1891).
12 Id. at p. 373.
13 13 A.B.A. REP. 247 et seq. (1890); Snyder, The Problem of Uniform
Legislation in the United States, 15 A.B.A. REP. 287 (1892).
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compact, interstate codes and uniform laws were all means of equal
merit for the achievement of uniformity.
In 1890 the Conference reported that it had carefully considered
federal enactments and felt that they provided "only a partial remedy" and "in order to bring about the desired uniformity we must
have not only legislation by Congress but legislation by the legislatures of the different States." 4
In 1890 Mr. Brewster in summarizing objections to the program
of uniformity in marriage and divorce laws said:
The first objection raised is the fear that a systematic
movement in the direction of uniformity may destroy the
autonomy or at least the individuality of the states-that
even a self-imposed uniformity tends to centralization, and
is opposed to the excellent principles of local self government. We believe this apprehension is unwarranted .... 15
Another objection asserts that the results of uniformity
can better be advanced and permanently secured by national
unification-by Congressional action, and, if necessary, by
constitutional amendment-than by separate state action.
That this method would have the advantage of more complete uniformity and permanency, if it were practicable,
must be admitted. But the inseparable difficulties in the
way of positive national action, at present, are so apparent
that this alternative is really out of the question. 6
In fields other than marriage and divorce there was also demand for national action and Mr. Brewster reported, "Two or three
members of the Committee were of the opinion that on some of the
subjects referred to us unification by Congressional action was preferable to uniformity by state action." '1
It is clear indeed that in these formative days the Conference
and the American Bar Association saw no serious danger in uniformity gained through federal action, but rather felt that if federal jurisdiction extended into fields where the Conference thought
uniformity desirable that federal legislation was the preferable
means of achieving their goal. It was not until 1892 that the state
sovereignty argument presented itself and even then it seems to
have been offered more as an argument to goad states into action
than as an argument against Congressional legislation.
The problem of uniform legislation, therefore, so far as
relates to those subjects not deleoated to the United State3
or to Congress, must be solved, either by the States surrendering more power, or by exercising it with uniformity in
their several legislatures. 8 (Emphasis supplied.)
14 Supra note 5.
15 Brewster, Report, Committee on Uniform State Laws, 14 A.B.A.
365, 370 (1891).

16 Supra note 15, at 373.
Supra note 11, at 366.
is Supra note 13, at 288.
1

REP.
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In spite of the political capital that has been made of the threat
of federal encroachment, the jurisdictional line between the federal
government and the states has been adhered to substantially as
marked out originally in the Constitution. The so-called expansion
of Congressional power has not been legal or political expansion but
simply a factual change in the nature of commerce-a change ever
emphasizing the national character of commercial activity.
The predictions of 1789 have come true. As the Conference
itself reported in 1898: "Science, and invention, steam, and electricity know nothing of state boundaries .... The strong tendency
toward urban life, the centralization, and consolidation of all methods of interstate commerce, and business intercourse of every kind,
• . . all unite to wipe away the provincial differences of former
days.' 0
This theme reoccurs in the address of President Harno in 1948
when he asserted: "I wish to disavow any thought of making a
customary speech on states' rights. Emotional nostalgia should not
confuse our thinking as we appraise the problem.... Maintaining
a structure of a strong central government does not necessarily entail weakening in the structure of the state and local government." 20
May it be hoped that the Conference is returning to the faith
of the founding commissioners. The issue of federal-state jurisdiction at the legal level is one for the Supreme Court and not for the
Conference and at the factual level it is for the people themselves as
was well pointed out by Mr. Brewster in 1891 when he said:
"Variance, dissonance, contradiction, nay, any unnecessary diversity
in the 50 sub-divisions of the one American people in the general
laws effecting (sic) the whole people in their business and social
relations cannot but produce perplexity, uncertainty and damage. ' 2 1
Today, even more than 50 years ago, it is to the interest of buyers and sellers, producers and wholesalers, investors and bankers,
and to their lawyers, to have a single code of laws covering the
transactions of commerce.2 2 This is a mutual concern of both the
states and the federal government. The adoption of the proposed
Commercial Code by the national legislature is more in aid of, and
auxiliary to, state regulation than in challenge to it. The cost of
19 Brewster, Uniform State Laws, 21 A.B.A. REP. 315, 316 (1898).
20

Harno, President's Address, Press Release 4, 8 (August 30, 1948).
Supra note 11, at 371.
22 "No matter what may be said for or against codification; no matter
what fine-spun theories may be urged to discourage the use of written
codes; no matter what plausible arguments may be brought to bear to show
that the substantive law can never be embraced within a written code;
nevertheless, the universal judgment of the commercial world has emphasized their necessity, and written codes have been adopted in about every
civilized country on the globe." Snyder, The Problem of Uniform Legislation in the United States, 15 A.B.A. REP. 287, 308 (1892).
21
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isolation is too high for the Conference or the states to cast aside
the opportunity for unification of commercial law at all jurisdictional
levels and for all transactions.
It is anachronistic for the Conference to urge the necessity of
uniformity between the laws of the several states and to ignore the
disparity between the laws of the states and the federal government. Inasmuch as federal legislation is potentially applicable in
each state, the effect of federal diversity is much more keenly felt
than disparity between the laws of the several states. Choice of
law in the conflicts situation is much less a concern of the average
practitioner than choice within a state between the possible applicability of state and federal law. Since Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, ' the uniformity between state and federal law so imperfectly
promised in Erie RailroadCo. v. Tompkins 2 4 appears to be a fading
hope. Long ago the Conference itself recognized that uniformity
through judicial action was impracticable 25 and it seems no more
likely to provide the answer in the field of the state-federal relationships. It is clear that the Code presents the best thinking of
the Commissioners of the several states; if Congress adopts their proposal it is much more logical to say that Congress is following the
wishes and the lead of the states than that Congress has entered the
field to interfere with state autonomy. The Conference should not
quickly be persuaded by those interests who may raise the statefederal issue in order to mask their real opposition to the merits of
the Code itself.
THE CODE V. CHAPTER ADOPTIONS

In recent years the Conference has believed that legislatures
enact short acts more readily than long ones, and that consequently,
the Commercial Code should be broken into its component articles
and chapters and offered for piecemeal adoption. Though frequently urged as a proper means of presentation, 26 such a proposal
would insure the failure of uniformity in the commercial field.
Better the advice of Brewster:
Uniformity, on any subject, to be of any permanent
value, must generally be through Partial Codification, that
is, putting into statutory shape the whole law on the particular subject matter to be unified. Tinkering, I suspect
will not do. The tinker, although in, old times, a useful
member of the community, had a rather unenviable reputation, chiefly, I suppose, on account of the lack of permanency in his patchwork.27
23 326 U. S. 99 (1945).
24 304 U. S. 64 (1938).

25

Supra note 5.

Suipra note 1, at 447. "If a subject is divisible so that instead of one
long act two or more shorter acts can be drafted their passage will be
aided and enactment be more easily obtained."
27 Supra note 11, at 372.
26

1948]

THE FUTURE OF UNIFORM LAWS

Splitting the Commercial Code would create internal disunity
in its provisions. A state might adopt the chapter revising the law
of sales, but not adopt the chapter on bills of lading; or it might
adopt the negotiable instruments chapter but fail to adopt the chapter on bank collections. A commercial transaction cannot be dismembered. Even intrastate transactions would not be covered by a
consistent body of law and those which transcended state boundaries would suffer perhaps even more than they do at present. The
entire law relating to commercial transactions must be uniform, or
no uniformity exists at all.
Brewster is correct; tinkering will not do. Piecemeal adoption
will reduce the probability of adoption of all the pieces. As was
pointed out earlier,2 8 it was the need for codification rather than subject matter that' caused the widespread adoption of the early commercial acts. Thus, if the need for codification is the reason for
enactment, the Conference would retard acceptance by the states
if it offered fragmentary parts of the code for adoption.
A short act normally is concerned with limited subject matter.
It is likely to infuse new elements and to change the existing common law for a single situation and thus aggravate rather than simplify the work of the lawyer. Because of the narrowness of the
subject matter the legislature will not view the proposal as sufficiently important to justify legislative consideration and lawyers
will not support it, for it means greater diversity in their practice
rather than simplicity, even if the act clarifies the law in a particular field. By its very narrowness it is likely to create peripheral
doubt as to the common-law or statutory rule in other areas and,
although the Conference may feel at ease in having taken short and
cautious steps with narrow acts, 2 9 it is likely to discover that the
proposals will not meet with widespread legislative acceptance.
It is for these reasons that any proposal to present the code
piecemeal should be looked upon with the greatest of suspicion.
No approach other than outright opposition could be more calculated
to insure the ultimate failure of the Commercial Code. Transactions in the business world are not divided up into the artificial segments with which lawyers so familiarly deal. A commercial transaction of any considerable importance carries with it problems of
sales, financing, documents of title, negotiable paper, and a host of
security devices, the legal effect of which the Commercial Code correctly attempts to treat in the same unified way as they are treated
in the commercial world. If but a portion of the Code is offered for
adoption, then the transaction which the business man must view
as a unit will be carved by the lawyer's action into a multiplicity of
28 See this article page 559 supra.
29 Supra note 1.
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parts none of which may be reassembled through piecemeal adoption.
THE PREPARATION OF UNIFORM ACTS AM CODES
Any generalization on this subject is likely to be both inaccurate
and unfair to many of the draftsmen who have labored diligently
and conscientiously in the preparation of acts for the Conference.
Nevertheless, the conclusion cannot be escaped that most of the
draftsmen, busy lawyers, judges, and professors, have had neither
the time nor the staff to do the necessary research for a first rate
drafting job. The historical and traditional assumption that good
laws may be made by legislative fiat and do not need antecedent
nonlegal research has hindered the effectiveness of all legislation
including the uniform acts.
The deep chasm which only now is being bridged between the
law and the society in which it operates has long stood as a barrier
to effective legislative regulation. Here again, though it is customary to think of progress as a steady and uninterrupted advance, we
discover that at the time of the establishment of the American Bar
Association and in the early days of the Conference the relation of
the statute law to the factual conditions of our society was better
understood than through most of the years of this century.
As early as 1878 with the establishment of the American Bar
Association, the lawyers of that Association directed their attention
to the growth of law through legislation and commanded their president to report annually on "the most noteworthy changes in statute
law ... made in the several States and by Congress during the pre-

ceding year."30 It appointed one committee to promote uniformity
in the statutory law of the states 31 and another to encourage uniformity in procedure." It assisted in the establishment of the Conference and, as it does to this day, provided major financial support
to its program.33
Its concern with and understanding of the relation of law to
society in those early days is best epitomized by a distinguished address made to its annual meeting in 1888. Mr. J. M. Woolworth said:
I ask you to look at laws not as ultimate facts ... but as

a certain class of social phenomena....
All the jural conceptions, legal institutions, judicial administration and methods of juridical logic of a people....
are reflected from the common morality, intelligence, industries, wealth, aesthetic taste, and other mental and moral
A.B.A. CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, 1 A.B.A. REP. 18 (1878).
31 Originally as a part of the work of the Committee on Jurisprudence
and Law Reform, 1 A.B.A. REP. 88 (1878).
32 Committee on Judicial Administration and Remedial Procedure,
30

supra note 31.
.'3Schnader, President's Address, 1940 HANDBOOK, CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE

LAws 35 et seq.
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characteristics. The process of their moral philosophy
have fed their theories of right; the exigencies of commerce,
the products of adventurous enterprise, the contrivance of
inventive skill, the accumulations of capital, and the aggressive demands of dissatisfied labor, compel laws which
otherwise would be needless and impossible.
The whole series of illustrations which have been presented in this discursive way, brings out this great truth
that the rules with which we are daily dealing and by which
we guide our clients in their transactions and defend their
rights, are not the contrivance of lawyers nor the construction of lawmakers. Nor are they accidents happening we
know not how nor atoms having no fellowship. More than
that, taken together they do not form a body of truths and
principles, a system, a scheme, a science, with relations only
to themselves, and beyond whose circumscriptions all other
truths and principles are alien, with which they have no alliance. Law is a fact in the midst of the many other facts of
society having relations to them all; on the one hand taking
its conceptions, doctrines, principles, maxims and processes
by refection from them, and on the other impressing itself
with energy upon the history, structure, institutions and
theories of the State. 3
This underscoring of law as a social science found reflection in
the Conference as well. In 1905 James Barr Ames, a figure more
frequently associated with conceptualistic legal theory, having been
appointed to draft the Uniform Partnership Act, declined to continue
with the work unless the mercantile rather than the legal theory
of partnership was accepted and stated:
I have endeavored to bring before you my difficulty because it did not seem to me worth while to attempt to bring
about uniformity in the law of partnership unless we attempted to get the mercantile idea of a partnership; I feel
that so strongly that, if the Conference thinks my plan undesirable, I should much prefer to have some one else draw
the act; I should have no heart in drawing an act on any
other theory, and it would seem to me very unwise to
stereotype in a statute so many anomalies as must be stereotyped if we attempt to enact in a law the lawyer's technical
conception, which is in direct violation of the mercantile
understanding.3 5
To an ever increasing degree the need for law to reflect social
and economic conditions has become apparent. This need has increased the burden of drafting to the point that a single commissioner can scarcely undertake the drafting of even a simple act
without doing a superficial job or seriously slighting his regular
engagements. It is one of the reasons, though probably uncon. Woolworth, Jurisprudence Considered as a Branch of the Social
Sciences, 11 A.B.A. REP. 279, 280, 297-300 (1888).

35 Ames, (discussing Report of Committee on Commercial Law), 28
A.B.A. REP. 732, 737 (1905).
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sciously advanced, for the Commissioners' preference for short acts.
On the basis of time alone, a comprehensive code is entirely beyond
the capacity of any single Commissioner.
In spite of these obstacles the Commercial Code has returned
to the early traditions of the Conference. It has been built upon
the actual commercial and banking experience of communities large
and small. This has required the cooperative effort of a staff of
legal and economic researchers and skilled draftsmen. It has required a large body of official and unofficial advisers. It has required organization. The result is that prior to its presentation to
the Conference and Institute the Code has been subjected to extensive and organized consideration, testing, and revision. Such a careful, thorough and scientific process is expensive. Were it not for
the assistance of a far-seeing foundation,36 the Code could not have
been completed.
A review of the Commercial Code with its appended "notes and
comments" discloses clearly the superior quality of a product produced by these methods.3 7 It seems obvious that the future program of the Conference will tend more and more toward the promulgation of fewer acts-acts more comprehensive in coverage,
more carefully prepared, and more extensively tested.38 This program cannot be accomplished on a part-time basis by a few individuals who contribute generously of their time to the profession and
to the public service. These individuals will still be needed. Their
function, however, is at the reviewing and counselling stage. A fulltime staff of legal and economic researchers must be maintained by
the Conference.
A permanent staff may not be the solution, however. The scope
of the subject matter in which the Conference is interested will
make it a difficult task to find and retain personnel competent in
such diversified fields as taxation, evidence, and commercial transactions. There must be flexibility in the staff.
Perhaps a small skeleton staff for routine work should be maintained on a permanent basis. However, the most effective work will
be done through research grants to individuals who can take leave
from their regular occupations for a few months or a year and who
will have funds available to employ assistants of their own choos36

Maurice and Laura Falk Foundation, Pittsburgh.

(Student ed. 1948).
38 Harno, Report of Committee on Scope and Program, 1945 HAND37 CODES OF COMMERCIAL LAW

LAWS. "Often acts
are approved that are poorly drawn. Expert draftsmanship is lacking.
What is more, some bills show a want of study of background materials and
research. The Conference should find means through which every question
considered by it would be given thorough study and every bill proposed
by it would be expertly drafted."
BOOK, CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
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THE FUTURE OF UNIFORM LAWS

ing. Travel funds must be available for lawyers, judges, and professors who will act as consultants and who can meet in groups for
thorough and intensive review of the work of the staff. Only in this
manner can codes of comprehensive character be prepared with
sufficient thoroughness to commend themselves for serious consideration by the legislatures.
The permanent staff will be occupied with the preparation of
amendments to be proposed to the legislatures of particular states
in order to conform their existing statutes to the substantive uniformity of the uniform actsY' This staff should also have the detail work of considering amendments to the permanent codes. None
of the codes, no matter how expertly drawn originally, must be considered as completely permanent and final. Particularly if the codes
are to reflect the business practice and the social and economic conditions of our society, they must be constantly reviewed in order
that, as changes and improvements in business practice make need
for change in the law, amendments can be prepared to assure the
vigor and practicability of the code provisions.

THE FuTuRE OF THE CODE AND CODES
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that the Conference is in the midst of a substantial change of programming from
the immediately preceding years. It is also clear that the philosophy
behind the present program is not new but more nearly consistent
with goals and the purposes of the Conference at the time of its
founding. The research and the philosophy of the Code's draftsmen accord with Dean Ames' admonition that the "lawyer's technical conception" cannot be accepted when it is "in direct violation
of the mercantile understanding." They have sought to discover the
details and particulars of mercantile intercourse so that the rules
accord with both the spirit and the mechanics of commerce. In
matters of substance the Code is a substantial forward step in scientific legislative drafting.
Two policy hurdles remain. One relates to the form in which
the Code will be offered for adoption; the other relates to the jurisdictions to which it will be offered for adoption. A review of past
experience of the Conference, together with the understanding of
the function of the Conference as it was understood at the time of
its establishment, seems to indicate clearly that the Code must be
offered as a Code and not piecemeal, and that it must be proposed to
all legislative bodies having jurisdiction over commercial transactions within our borders. Unless both of these steps are taken it is
difficult to predict genuine success for the endeavor. And should
general enactment fail, the Conference will be in the unhappy pre39 See text page 560 supra.
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dicament of having made a partial experiment and will not know
the cause of its failure. Conversely, if the Code is offered as a Code
to all jurisdictions there are strong indications that its chances for
success are considerable. In the first place, the best explanation of
prior Conference success has been its ability to meet the needs for
codification. When no such need existed, good Conference acts have
not been adopted. When the uncertainty of the common law and
the occasional and uncodified statute left lawyers in doubt as to the
actual state of the law, uniform acts found ready acceptance. In
the second place, codification on the broadest jurisdictional base not
only will provide the widest uniformity but will contribute greatly
to the achievement of total uniformity in all jurisdictions. The Conference cannot afford to reject this opportunity.
If the Conference takes this course and it is as successful as it
would appear to be, then, the future of the Conference as an institution would seem to be assured and its future operation will continue
along these lines: First,limitation of endeavor to substantial codes
in fields where uniformity between the states is both practical and
necessary. Second, a substantial reduction in the number of small
and "tinkering" acts. Third, the establishment of full-time research
staffs.
With such a program the Conference seems assured of making
a contribution to the jurisprudence of this generation at least equal
to that of the day of its great success with the Negotiable Instruments Act.

